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I. INTRODUCTION

Long-term trusts pose a fundamental challenge both to local property
law and to the federal estate tax. For many years, courts and legislatures
have struggled to articulate an intelligible outer limit on the length of time
that dynastically minded trust settlors should be allowed to tie up beneficial
ownership of property. The result, in this country, has been widespread
adoption of some version of a common law or statutory rule against remote
vesting (known generically as the rule against perpetuities) or a functionally
similar rule against suspension of the power of alienation. Despite
significant local variations in the form of these rules and a certain
ambivalence concerning their underlying justification, the traditional
consensus in favor of promoting alienability and curbing perpetual deadhand control has remained largely intact—until recently.
Long-term trusts also play a key role in tax planning. Ordinarily a gift
or estate tax is imposed on each transfer as property passes from one
generation to the next. Nevertheless, by leaving property in trust, a settlor
can readily shelter property from gift and estate taxes (after the initial
transfer in trust) for as long as the trust is permitted to last under local
* Professor, University of Florida Levin College of Law. I am grateful to Paul Caron for
organizing the Tax Advice for the Second Obama Administration symposium and for moderating the
panel on estate and gift taxation. I am also indebted to the late Jesse Dukeminier for suggesting the
title of this paper several years ago during a conversation about perpetual trusts. This article is part
of Pepperdine Law Review’s January 18, 2013 Tax Advice for the Second Obama Administration
symposium, co-sponsored by Tax Analysts.
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property law, while providing beneficial enjoyment for successive
generations of beneficiaries. To curb this avenue of tax avoidance, Congress
enacted a generation-skipping transfer (GST) tax, which operates as a proxy
for the gift or estate tax that would have been imposed if property had
passed outright from one generation to the next instead of being tied up in
trust.1 The GST tax has significantly limited the use of long-term trusts to
shelter unlimited accumulations of wealth from transfer taxes, prompting
estate planners to develop new tax avoidance techniques. Their attention has
focused on the GST exemption, originally set at $1 million, which allows an
individual transferor to transfer an equivalent amount of property free of
GST tax.2 An allocation of exemption to a generation-skipping trust initially
funded with $1 million ensures that the entire trust, including unlimited
future appreciation, will remain exempt from GST tax throughout the trust
term. The primary constraint on the duration of such a trust, and hence on
its potential for GST tax avoidance, is found in the applicable rule against
perpetuities under local law.
To the extent that the rule against perpetuities represents the last
remaining obstacle in an otherwise clear path to perpetual exemption from
transfer taxes, it is hardly surprising that the rule has come under attack.
What is perhaps surprising is the speed with which efforts to reform and
improve the rule have been overtaken by a headlong rush to abolish it
altogether. In the space of less than twenty years, at least half the states,
responding to intense lobbying by lawyers, bankers, and financial planners,
have enacted statutes authorizing perpetual trusts, with the express goal of
attracting trust business from other states.3 The linkage between the 1986
enactment of the GST tax—or, more precisely, of the $1 million exemption
from the tax—and the demise of the rule against perpetuities has attracted

1. See I.R.C. §§ 2601–54. Unless otherwise indicated, all I.R.C. citations refer to the Internal
Revenue Code of 1986, as amended through January 2, 2013. The current version of the GST tax
was enacted in 1986, replacing (and retroactively repealing) the original version enacted in 1976.
See Tax Reform Act of 1986, Pub. L. 99–514, §§ 1431–33, 100 Stat. 2085, 2717 (1986); Tax
Reform Act of 1976, Pub. L. 94–455, § 2006, 90 Stat. 1520, 1879 (1976).
2. See I.R.C. § 2631. In 2010 the GST exemption was set at $5 million (indexed for inflation
beginning in 2012). See Tax Relief, Unemployment Insurance Reauthorization, and Job Creation
Act of 2010, Pub. L. 111-312, § 302(a), 124 Stat. 3296, 3301 (2010); see also American Taxpayer
Relief Act of 2012, Pub. L. 112-240, § 101(c), 126 Stat. 2313 (2013) (extending increased
exemption for 2013 and subsequent years).
3. A 2011 tally shows twenty-five states and the District of Columbia as allowing perpetual (or
nearly perpetual) private trusts, and another four states should be added to the list. See
RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF PROP. WILLS AND OTHER DONATIVE TRANSFERS ch. 27, intro. note
(2011); ARIZ. REV. STAT. ANN. § 14–2901 (2012); COLO. REV. STAT. § 15–11–1102.5 (2013); HAW.
REV. STAT. § 525–4(6) (2012); WASH. REV. CODE § 11.98.130 (2013). For an excellent analysis of
interstate competition for trust business, see Stewart E. Sterk, Jurisdictional Competition to Abolish
the Rule Against Perpetuities: R.I.P. for the R.A.P., 24 CARDOZO L. REV. 2097, 2101–02 (2003)
[hereinafter Sterk, Jurisdictional Competition].
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considerable attention.4
It is not entirely clear, however, to what extent the movement to abolish
the rule is driven solely or primarily by tax avoidance. Jesse
Dukeminier and James Krier argue that: [The rise of perpetual trusts]
has little if anything to do with some wish on the part of wealthy people
to control the lives of their unknown descendants; rather, it has to do
with their interest in saving on federal transfer taxes imposed at the
descendants’ deaths, and on competition among the states to cater to that
interest.5
Joshua Tate, however, contends that “while tax concerns are very important,
there are many other reasons why a settlor might want to set up a dynasty
trust”—for example, to safeguard a family fortune from improvident
beneficiaries, to defeat creditors’ claims, or to perpetuate the settlor’s
memory and pass on a set of ethical values to future generations.6
In their recent empirical work, Robert Sitkoff and Max Schanzenbach
shed additional light on the relationship between the GST tax and the rule
against perpetuities. Based on a detailed study of personal trust data, they
attribute the decline of the rule directly to the “federal wealth transfer taxes,”
which they view as having “mortally wounded the once-mighty Rule by
reducing it to a mere transaction cost.”7 The essential thrust of their
argument can be summarized as follows: (1) before 1986 there was little
demand for perpetual private trusts, even though they were tolerated by local
law in at least three states; (2) after enactment of the GST tax in 1986,
numerous states enacted statutes abolishing the rule against perpetuities in
order to attract trust business; and (3) states that abolished the rule and also

4. For a sampling of commentary, see Ira Mark Bloom, The GST Tax Tail Is Killing the Rule
Against Perpetuities, 87 TAX NOTES 569 (2000); Jesse Dukeminier & James E. Krier, The Rise of
the Perpetual Trust, 50 UCLA L. REV. 1303 (2003); Max M. Schanzenbach & Robert H. Sitkoff,
Perpetuities or Taxes? Explaining The Rise of the Perpetual Trust, 27 CARDOZO L. REV. 2465
(2006) [hereinafter Schanzenbach & Sitkoff, Perpetuities or Taxes?]; Robert H. Sitkoff & Max M.
Schanzenbach, Jurisdictional Competition for Trust Funds: An Empirical Analysis of Perpetuities
and Taxes, 115 YALE L.J. 356 (2005) [hereinafter Sitkoff & Schanzenbach, Empirical Analysis];
Sterk, Jurisdictional Competition, supra note 3; see also RAY D. MADOFF, IMMORTALITY AND THE
LAW: THE RISING POWER OF THE AMERICAN DEAD 78–82 (2010); Mary Louise Fellows, Why the
Generation-Skipping Transfer Tax Sparked Perpetual Trusts, 27 CARDOZO L. REV. 2511 (2006).
5. Dukeminier & Krier, supra note 4, at 1314–15.
6. Joshua C. Tate, Perpetual Trusts and the Settlor’s Intent, 53 U. KAN. L. REV. 595, 617
(2005); id. at 613–17 (responding to Dukeminier and Krier).
7. Sitkoff & Schanzenbach, Empirical Analysis, supra note 4, at 421; see also id. at 359
(describing 1986 GST tax as the “driving force”); Schanzenbach & Sitkoff, Perpetuities or Taxes?,
supra note 4, at 2470 (arguing that “the modern perpetual trust is primarily a creature of the federal
transfer taxes”).
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imposed no fiduciary income tax on out-of-state trusts reported
disproportionate increases in personal trust assets and average account size.
Echoing Dukeminier and Krier, they argue that “the movement to abolish
the Rule and the corresponding rise of the perpetual trust reflect strategies to
minimize taxes, not a burgeoning desire among donors for perpetual
control.”8 This account is simple, bold, and powerful, but at best it provides
only a partial and selective explanation of the complex interaction between
the federal transfer taxes and the rule against perpetuities.
II. TRANSFER TAX AVOIDANCE BEFORE 1986
Understandably, and perhaps unavoidably, the rule against perpetuities
is often portrayed as a more or less monolithic and ubiquitous doctrine,
immutably embodied in John Chipman Gray’s “classic formulation” of the
common law rule against remote vesting, which suddenly fell victim to a
frenzy of legislative repeal after 1986 as state legislatures rushed to
authorize perpetual trusts.9 But this is an oversimplification. Long before
the advent of the GST tax, at least three states allowed the creation of
perpetual trusts. In Delaware, this could be accomplished by creating
successive powers of appointment, thanks to a statutory modification of the
common law rule which measured the permissible period for vesting of
interests from the date of a power’s exercise rather than its creation.10 In
Wisconsin and Idaho, the technique was different. Both states had adopted
statutory rules against suspension of the power of alienation in lieu of the
common law rule against remote vesting,11 and in Wisconsin the statutory
rule was interpreted to allow perpetual trusts as long as the trustee had a
power of sale.12 In Idaho, the statutory rule was interpreted to require a
8. Schanzenbach & Sitkoff, Perpetuities or Taxes?, supra note 4, at 2497.
9. Sitkoff & Schanzenbach, Empirical Analysis, supra note 4, at 364; see also id. at 373 (“As a
general matter, prior to 1986 there was little significant variation in trust law across the states.”); cf.
id. at 377 (acknowledging “some doctrinal nuances that we gloss over when we speak of the Rule’s
abolition,” including abolition of the rule for trusts where the trustee has a power of sale, abolition
for trusts of personal property, extended perpetuities periods, and opt-out rules).
10. See 1933 Del. L. ch. 138, § 1. The estate tax loophole exploited by the Delaware statute was
eventually blocked by the enactment of the “Delaware tax trap.” See Revenue Act of 1942, Pub. L.
77-753, § 403(a), 56 Stat. 798, 942 (1942).
11. The Wisconsin and Idaho statutes, modeled on a New York statute of 1830, supplanted the
common law rule. See Becker v. Chester, 91 N.W. 87 (Wis. 1902); Locklear v. Tucker, 203 P.2d
380 (Idaho 1949). Unlike the common law rule against remote vesting, which eventually became
established as the “rule against perpetuities” toward the end of the nineteenth century (see In re
Hargreaves, 43 Ch.D. 401 (1890)), the rule against suspension of the power of alienation prohibits
tying up property in unborn or unascertained beneficiaries beyond the applicable perpetuities period.
See generally LEWIS M. SIMES, HANDBOOK OF THE LAW OF FUTURE INTERESTS 298–313 (2d ed.
1966).
12. See Will of Walker, 45 N.W.2d 94, 97 (Wis. 1950) (“If the trustee has power to sell, which
he may exercise within the time specified by the statute, the trust is not void under our statutes even
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power of termination in beneficiaries living at the creation of the trust, but
that restriction was expressly abrogated for trusts of personal property,
leaving no restrictions on the duration of such trusts.13 It is worth noting that
for many years before 1986 perpetuities law was far from uniform; that
trusts of indefinite duration could be created, sometimes in states that still
had some version of the rule against perpetuities on the books; that perpetual
trusts came in various forms; and, therefore, that one should be careful about
equating the availability of perpetual trusts with “abolition” of the rule.14
Moreover, as we shall see, the peculiarities of local perpetuities law have
continuing significance for federal tax purposes.
One obvious question is why the availability of perpetual trusts in a few
states did not set off a rush to abolish the rule against perpetuities even
before the enactment of the GST tax. (For this purpose, the relevant year is
1976, when the original version of the GST tax was enacted.15) Proponents
of the standard tax-driven explanation might suggest that until the $1 million
GST exemption appeared in 1986, there was no compelling tax incentive to
use perpetual trusts, but this ignores the estate and gift taxes. Long before
1976—when estate tax rates were much higher (and the taxable threshold
much lower) than in later years—it was possible, at least in Wisconsin and
Idaho, to create perpetual trusts that would shelter property indefinitely from
estate and gift taxes (after the initial transfer).16 If the demand for perpetual
trusts is driven primarily by transfer tax avoidance, one might expect to
discover that Wisconsin and Idaho either captured a disproportionate share
of trust business or spurred other states to authorize perpetual trusts. Yet
this does not seem to have happened. Finding “little evidence . . . that
people valued perpetual trusts prior to the GST tax,” Sitkoff and
Schanzenbach infer that “without the GST tax incentive to act as a wedge,
few individuals would establish perpetual trusts.”17 Why should a loophole
though the trust in the converted fund is perpetual.”). See generally Ira Mark Bloom, Transfer Tax
Avoidance: The Impact of Perpetuities Restrictions Before and After Generation-Skipping Taxation,
45 ALB. L. REV. 261, 274–75 (1981).
13. See 1957 Idaho Sess. L. ch. 54, § 1; In re Zeb’s Estate, 189 P.2d 95 (Idaho 1947) (applying
prior law).
14. Cf. Sitkoff & Schanzenbach, Empirical Analysis, supra note 4, at 378 (“For the purpose of
this study, all that matters is whether the state’s perpetuities law in effect permits a perpetual trust.”).
15. See supra note 5.
16. See Bloom, supra note 12, at 290 (“Prior to generation-skipping taxation, there were ample
means available for perpetual transfer tax avoidance.”); George Cooper, A Voluntary Tax? New
Perspectives on Sophisticated Estate Tax Avoidance, 77 COLUM. L. REV. 161, 206 (1977)
(describing perpetual generation-skipping trust as “the ultimate estate planning scheme”).
17. Sitkoff & Schanzenbach, Empirical Analysis, supra note 4, at 399. Noting that statutes
repealing the common law rule were enacted in Idaho (1957), Wisconsin (1969), and South Dakota
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in the GST tax spark a widespread demand for perpetual trusts after 1986
while a similar loophole in the estate and gift taxes failed to do so before
1976?18
Certainly by 1976 estate planners were well aware of the tax benefits of
generation-skipping trusts, which were used almost exclusively by the very
rich.19 Indeed, the original GST tax was enacted in response to the perceived
unfairness of a transfer tax system that not only favored generation-skipping
trusts over functionally similar outright transfers but also undermined the
progressivity of the estate tax.20 Nevertheless, it seems that the vast majority
of generation-skipping trusts skipped only one generation; very few skipped
more than two.21 Until 1976, therefore, it may have seemed entirely
reasonable to assume that, with adequate planning, most settlors could
achieve their tax and non-tax objectives comfortably within the local
perpetuities period. Although the possibility of creating perpetual trusts was
well known, the incremental tax benefits of such trusts did not loom large

(1983), Sitkoff and Schanzenbach observe that “the abolition of the Rule Against Perpetuities prior
to the introduction of the GST tax had no observable effect on a state’s trust assets.” Id. at 398. This
is not surprising in the case of Wisconsin, since the 1969 statute merely codified prior law. See
supra note 18; cf. Schanzenbach & Sitkoff, Perpetuities or Taxes?, supra note 4, at 2473 n.32
(“Wisconsin may have abolished its Rule even earlier (indeed, Wisconsin may never have had the
Rule) . . . . We need not resolve the status of the Rule in Wisconsin prior to 1969, however, because
our data do not begin until that year.”); Sitkoff & Schanzenbach, Empirical Analysis, supra note 4, at
398 n.117.
18. Sitkoff and Schanzenbach speculate that the lack of interest in perpetual trusts before the
enactment of the GST tax may have been due either to ignorance on the part of lawyers or to the
prohibitive transaction costs of attracting trust business from other states “in an era before cheap
long distance calls, fax machines, and electronic mail.” Schanzenbach & Sitkoff, Perpetuities or
Taxes?, supra note 4, at 2495.
19. See Federal Estate and Gift Taxes: Public Hearings and Panel Discussions Before the H.
Comm. on Ways and Means, 94th Cong. 1333, 1333–35 (1976) [hereinafter 1976 Hearings]
(statement of A. James Casner) (describing structure and operation of generation-skipping trust);
Cooper, supra note 16, at 205 (“[U]se of [generation-skipping] trusts has been largely limited to the
very rich, probably because other estate planning techniques, not involving long-term trustification
of property, have been adequate for the less wealthy.”).
20. See STAFF OF J. COMM. ON TAX’N, GENERAL EXPLANATION OF THE TAX REFORM ACT OF
1976, at 564–65 (1976) [hereinafter 1976 BLUEBOOK].
21. See AM. LAW INST., FEDERAL ESTATE AND GIFT TAX PROJECT: STUDY ON GENERATIONSKIPPING TRANSFERS UNDER THE FEDERAL ESTATE TAX: DISCUSSION DRAFT NO. 1, at 119–20
(Mar. 28, 1984), reprinted in Generation-Skipping Transfer Tax: Hearing Before H. Comm. on Ways
& Means, 98th Cong. 49, 179–80 (1984) [hereinafter 1984 Hearings] (“[T]estamentary generationskipping transfers in trust principally skip a single generation . . . . [A] properly structured trust may
postpone transfer tax incidence until the expiration of the applicable limitation imposed by the rule
against perpetuities. Yet when actual trust dispositions are examined, it appears that few testators
made these tax minimizing transfers. Multiple generation-skipping did not often exceed two
generations.”); Robert Anthoine, Testamentary Trusts, in CARL S. SHOUP, FEDERAL ESTATE AND
GIFT TAXES 153, 169 (1966) (“[T]he normal family trust today involves a substantial amount of onegeneration skipping but little beyond that.”); see also 1976 Hearings, supra note 19, at 1419, 1421
(statement of Gerald R. Jantscher) (“[T]here are very few trusts created to skip two generations. Few
settlors appear to be willing to ti[e] up property past the lives of their grandchildren.”).
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and the rule against perpetuities was not perceived as a major impediment.22
The tax benefits of generation-skipping trusts were prospectively
curtailed by the original GST tax in 1976. Although the impact of the tax
could be mitigated through careful planning, it was no longer possible to
avoid transfer taxes indefinitely by means of generation-skipping trusts.23
Thus, from 1976 to 1986, even where perpetual trusts were allowed under
local law, they offered no greater tax benefits than conventional generationskipping trusts subject to the rule against perpetuities. Accordingly, when
South Dakota enacted legislation in 1983 declaring that “[t]he common-law
rule against perpetuities is not in force in this state,” the intent cannot have
been to enable avoidance of the existing GST tax (nor, presumably, to take
advantage of a $1 million GST exemption that would not be enacted for
another three years).24 Instead, the legislation appears to have been “part of
an aggressive campaign to attract trust and banking positions to the State”
unrelated to transfer tax avoidance.25
III. TRANSFER TAX AVOIDANCE AFTER 1986
With the enactment of the revised GST tax—or, more precisely, the $1
million GST exemption—in 1986, perpetual trusts reappeared as a viable
technique for indefinite transfer tax avoidance.
The situation was
complicated, however, by the interaction of the GST tax, the estate tax, and
local perpetuities law. To shelter a generation-skipping trust from GST tax
under current law, all that is needed is an allocation of GST exemption
sufficient to cover the initial value of the property transferred in trust; the
entire trust, including all future appreciation, will ordinarily remain
completely exempt from GST tax for as long as the trust remains in

22. See 1976 Hearings, supra note 19, at 1335 (statement of A. James Casner); id. at 505, 509
(statement of David Westfall); Cooper, supra note 16, at 206; see also 1984 Hearings, supra note 21,
at 335, 344–45 (statement of Raymond H. Young).
23. For example, the tax could be avoided—though not indefinitely—by creating separate
“layered” trusts for separate generations of beneficiaries. The tax could also be postponed by
requiring the accumulation of income or by giving an individual beneficiary a special power to
distribute income or corpus to younger generations of the transferor’s descendants. In addition,
Congress provided an express exemption for transfers to grandchildren. See generally 1976
BLUEBOOK, supra note 20, at 564–83; Ira Mark Bloom, The Generation-Skipping Loophole:
Narrowed, But Not Closed, By the Tax Reform Act of 1976, 53 WASH. L.REV. 31, 53–61 (1977);
Cooper, supra note 16, at 206–07.
24. 1983 S.D. Sess. L. ch. 304, § 4. The legislation preserved restrictions on the suspension of
the power of alienation, subject to a Wisconsin-style safe harbor for a trustee’s power of sale. See
id. § 8.
25. Sterk, Jurisdictional Competition, supra note 3, at 2101–02.
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existence. The GST exemption may be jeopardized, however, if the trust
becomes subject to estate tax in the hands of a beneficiary.
The most likely trigger for estate tax inclusion is the “Delaware tax
trap,” which has emerged from obscurity to play a prominent role in tax
planning since 1986.26 Recall that in Delaware a trust could be extended
indefinitely through the exercise of successive powers of appointment.27
The Delaware tax trap was originally enacted to prevent indefinite estate tax
avoidance through successive powers. Now it serves as an escape route
from the GST tax, but its applicability depends on the peculiarities of local
perpetuities law. For example, in a state that retains some version of the
common law rule against remote vesting or a statutory rule against
suspension of the power of alienation, the tax trap may be sprung by
exercising a special power of appointment to create another power
(including a presently exercisable general power) that might postpone
vesting or prolong suspension for a period unrelated to the date the first
power was created. Less obviously, the tax trap may be sprung even if the
rule against perpetuities has been completely abolished, because in the
absence of any limitation on remote vesting or suspension of the power of
alienation it is impossible to ascertain a perpetuities period by reference to
the date the first power was created.28 In contrast, the estate tax has been
held inapplicable to the creation of successive powers where, under the
applicable statutory rule against suspension of the power of alienation, the
perpetuities period for a future interest or trust created by the second power
runs from the creation of the first power, even if the statutory rule is
automatically satisfied by a trustee’s power of sale.29
Ironically, then, tax planners have learned that simple repeal of the rule
against perpetuities does not necessarily guarantee that a perpetual trust will

26. In its current form, the “Delaware tax trap” subjects a power of appointment to estate tax if it
is exercised:
[B]y creating another power of appointment which under the applicable local law can
be validly exercised so as to postpone the vesting of any estate or interest in such
property, or suspend the absolute ownership or power of alienation of such property, for
a period ascertainable without regard to the date of the creation of the first power.
I.R.C. § 2041(a)(3). See generally Jonathan G. Blattmachr & Jeffrey N. Pennell, Adventures in
Generation-Skipping, or How We Learned to Love the “Delaware Tax Trap”, 24 REAL PROP. PROB.
& TR. J. 75 (1989).
27. Technically, this result follows from a statutory provision which treats interests created by
exercise of a power of appointment, for purposes of the rule against perpetuities, as being created at
the time of the power’s exercise rather than its creation. See DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 25, § 501 (2012).
28. See Stephen E. Greer, The Delaware Tax Trap and the Abolition of the Rule Against
Perpetuities, 28 EST. PLAN. 68, 74 (2001); James P. Spica, A Trap for the Wary: Delaware’s AntiDelaware-Tax-Trap Statute Is Too Clever by Half (of Infinity), 43 REAL PROP. TR. & EST. L.J. 673,
682 (2009).
29. See Estate of Murphy v. Comm’r, 71 T.C. 671, 680–81 (1979) (Wisconsin law); Bloom,
supra note 12, at 284–90.
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enjoy complete immunity from transfer taxes. Although it is a relatively
simple matter to create a perpetual sequence of life income interests that
avoid estate taxation, planners routinely include powers of appointment to
make the dispositive plan more flexible and responsive to changing
circumstances. Moreover, to achieve maximum flexibility, such powers
usually may be exercised to modify the trust and create successive powers.
To avoid springing the Delaware tax trap, a perpetual trust should be
designed to ensure that interests created by the exercise of successive powers
of appointment remain subject to some form of perpetuities restriction (e.g.,
a limitation on remote vesting or on suspension of the power of alienation)
that relates back to the creation of the first power. One way to accomplish
this is to create a perpetual trust in a state that has a statutory rule against
suspension of the power of alienation under which the permissible period for
interests (or successive powers) created by exercise of a non-general power
of appointment runs from the creation of the power—even if the rule is
satisfied by a trustee’s power of sale.30 Alternatively, the trust may be
created in a state that retains a statutory rule against remote vesting with an
extended perpetuities period (e.g., 1000 years), as long as the period for
interests (or successive powers) created by exercise of a non-general power
runs from the creation of the power.31 Arguably, by blocking the limited but
well-established tax benefits of conventional generation-skipping trusts and
direct skips, the 1986 GST tax revisions encouraged tax planners to search
out new tax avoidance techniques.32

30. See, e.g., S.D. CODIFIED LAWS §§ 43-5-1, 43-5-4, 43-5-5 (2012); cf. DEL. CODE ANN. tit.
25, §§ 503, 504 (2012); Spica, supra note 28 (arguing that the Delaware provision fails to achieve its
intended purpose).
31. See, e.g., COLO. REV. STAT. § 15-11-1102.5(1), (3) (2013); MICH. COMP. LAWS § 554.93
(2012).
32. See Cooper, supra note 16, at 169 (predicting increased interest in tax avoidance as original
GST tax closed popular loopholes for the very rich); 1984 Hearings, supra note 21, at 30, 46
(statement of Harry L. Gutman) (“The frequency of ‘grandchildren exclusion’ trusts in post-1976
wills indicate[s] that individuals will create trusts to take advantage of ‘benefits,’ even though prior
to the enactment of [the GST tax] they did not take advantage of unlimited generation-skipping
opportunities.”); id. at 337, 338 (statement of Raymond H. Young, Chairman) (“People who
otherwise would have the good sense not to enter into any such arrangement will have their
judgment and decisions colored by what will seem to be an opportunity created for them to take
advantage of.”); id. at 313–14 (statement of Howard M. McCue III) (arguing that imposing GST tax
on direct skips would encourage “long-term discretionary trusts for grandchildren, greatgrandchildren, and more remote descendants”).
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IV. MARKETING PERPETUAL TRUSTS
Perpetual trusts undeniably offer opportunities for avoiding transfer
taxes, but this is not their sole attraction. Along with tax benefits, the
promotional literature for perpetual trusts touts their ability to conserve and
manage accumulated wealth for future generations and protect beneficiaries
against improvidence and misfortune (including claims of creditors and
former spouses).33 While the same features are also found in trusts of more
limited duration, the prospect of projecting the settlor’s control indefinitely
into the future intensifies the allure of perpetual trusts. Indeed, the
promotional literature is replete with thinly veiled appeals to settlors’ vanity
and dynastic aspirations.34 Of course the psychic benefits of perpetual trusts
cannot be empirically verified, and even the tax and financial advantages
should not be overstated. The potential tax benefits are limited initially by
the size of the GST exemption and ultimately by the trustee’s ability to
conserve the trust property and increase its value.35 Despite the rosy
scenario of exponential appreciation suggested by projections of tax-free
compounding over a century or more,36 the actual value of a perpetual trust
is likely to be eroded over time by administrative costs, income taxes, and
demands for distributions of income and corpus from an ever-proliferating
group of beneficiaries.37 Furthermore, Dukeminier and Krier identify what
they call a “problem of duration”: the longer a trust lasts, the greater the
33. See Tate, supra note 6, at 613–17. Moreover, competition for trust business has led several
states (including some but not all of those that allow perpetual trusts) to authorize self-settled
spendthrift trusts. See Sitkoff & Schanzenbach, Empirical Analysis, supra note 4, at 383–84 (noting
the similar “political dynamic” behind abolition of the rule against perpetuities and the validation of
self-settled spendthrift trusts, and observing that the former is driven by the desire “to provide a
transfer-tax-exempt trust for future generations” while the latter is driven by the desire to limit “the
settlor’s personal liability exposure”); Stewart E. Sterk, Asset Protection Trusts: Trust Law’s Race to
the Bottom?, 85 CORNELL L. REV. 1035 (2000) [hereinafter Sterk, Race to the Bottom].
34. See Tate, supra note 6, at 617–20. In a similar vein, a foundation catering to investors who
contemplate long-term cryogenic preservation reportedly promises that “you’ll be able to buy youth
and perfect health for centuries” and projects that a $10,000 investment will grow to more than $8
million in 100 years. See MADOFF, supra note 4, at 55 (quoting promotional brochure).
35. The GST exemption was set at $1 million in 1986 and indexed for inflation beginning in
1999. The base amount remained capped at $1 million during the initial rush to repeal the rule
against perpetuities from 1995 to 2003, and subsequent increases brought the exemption up to $5
million in 2010. A perpetual trust is subject to GST tax to the extent contributions exceed the
amount of GST exemption allocated to the trust. See I.R.C. §§ 2602, 2631, 2641, 2642.
36. See, e.g., RICHARD W. NENNO, DELAWARE DYNASTY TRUSTS, TOTAL-RETURN UNITRUSTS,
AND ASSET-PROTECTION TRUSTS 31, 222 (2008) (noting that a $1 million tax-exempt dynasty trust
compounded at 10% for 100 years would grow to more than $13 billion); Bloom, supra note 12, at
301 n.219 (noting that $1 million invested at 6% for 300 years would grow to approximately $50
trillion).
37. For a hardheaded analysis of dynasty trusts and their limitations, see William J. Turnier &
Jeffrey L. Harrison, A Malthusian Analysis of the So-Called Dynasty Trust, 28 VA. TAX REV. 779,
781 (2009) (concluding that “promoters [of dynasty trusts] promise more than such trusts are able to
deliver”).
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likelihood that strict adherence to its original terms may become wasteful
and counterproductive.38 Even in states that retain some version of the rule
against perpetuities, there is a trend to allow courts greater latitude to modify
the terms of a trust or terminate the trust at the request of the beneficiaries or
the trustee.39 In the case of a perpetual trust, the problem is likely to become
even more acute and the need for mechanisms to respond to changed
circumstances correspondingly more pressing. Careful drafting can provide
a degree of flexibility, but the courts will almost certainly be called on
sooner or later to balance the competing goals of enforcing the settlor’s
directions, protecting the beneficiaries’ interests, and ensuring efficient
administration by the trustee.40
By all accounts, the states that rushed to abolish the rule against
perpetuities did not do so in response to any groundswell of popular
sentiment. The vast majority of people will never incur estate or GST tax
liability, nor will they have $1 million in spare funds to lock up in a
perpetual tax-exempt trust. Instead, the demand for legislation authorizing
perpetual trusts came from lawyers and bankers who saw an opportunity to
attract new trust business or siphon off existing business from other states.
This competition for trust business was not intended to raise revenue for the
participating states, which for the most part imposed no income tax on trusts
with nonresident settlors and beneficiaries,41 nor was it likely to improve the
efficiency of local trust law.42 The immediate beneficiaries of perpetuities
38. Dukeminier & Krier, supra note 4, at 1327–39.
39. See UNIF. TRUST CODE §§ 411, 412, 414–416 (2011) (providing for modification,
termination, combination, and division of noncharitable trusts). These provisions are mandatory;
they cannot be overridden by the terms of the trust. See id. § 105(b)(4); see also RESTATEMENT
(THIRD) OF TRUSTS § 65 (2003).
40. See Dukeminier & Krier, supra note 4, at 1339–42 (proposing measures to limit dead hand
control over perpetual trusts); Tate, supra note 6, at 620–25 (criticizing proposals as defeating
settlor’s intent). Although it has been suggested that the problem of dead hand control can be
“resolved” by drafting a perpetual trust “so that each generation is given a special power to appoint
the remainder to the next generation outright or in further trust,” Sitkoff & Schanzenbach, Empirical
Analysis, supra note 4, at 413, such a power must be carefully drafted to avoid unintended estate tax
exposure. See supra notes 35–40 and accompanying text.
41. See Sitkoff & Schanzenbach, Empirical Analysis, supra note 4, at 410 (“only those states
that did not tax income in trusts attracted from out of state experienced an inflow of trust assets after
abolishing the Rule”); Sterk, Race to the Bottom, supra note 33, at 1060 (“Jurisdictions seeking to
become trust havens . . . appear content to draw business to local financial institutions and lawyers,
even without direct benefit to the public fisc.”).
42. See Sterk, Jurisdictional Competition, supra note 3, at 2113 (“even when agency costs are
high, settlor might create a [perpetual tax-exempt] trust to effect a transfer from the government (and
presumably, other taxpayers) to the settlor and her beneficiaries—even though the transfer generates
no social gain to offset the high agency costs”). See generally Sterk, Race to the Bottom, supra note
33, at 1055–74 (discussing jurisdictional competition for trust business in the context of asset
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repeal appear to be the bankers and lawyers who lobbied hard for enabling
legislation and invested heavily in marketing their services to prospective
clients.43 The promotional literature is remarkable less for its meager
informational content than for its tone of arrant puffery, which suggests that
it is aimed at an affluent but not very sophisticated audience.44 Consistent
with the goal of drawing in new clients, the literature casts perpetual trusts in
a soft and rosy light, vaguely promising financial security, perpetual control,
and lavish tax benefits without mentioning any potential drawbacks.45 It is
impossible to know whether perpetual trusts will ultimately perform as
promised. At this point, all that can be said with confidence is that the
bankers and lawyers who promote perpetual trusts have profited handsomely
from the rush to repeal the rule against perpetuities; the benefits to settlors
remain speculative; and the costs of recovering foregone tax revenues and
modifying stale trusts are being shifted to future taxpayers and
beneficiaries.46
V. UNINTENDED CONSEQUENCES
In amending the GST tax in 1986, Congress almost certainly did not
appreciate the full implications of the $1 million exemption, which was
intended primarily to make the tax simpler and easier to administer.
Professional organizations representing bankers, lawyers and other interest
groups, which had been largely sidelined in 1976,47 unanimously condemned
the original version of the GST tax and insisted that a generous exemption

protection trusts).
43. See Sitkoff & Schanzenbach, Empirical Analysis, supra note 4, at 417 (“The story of
jurisdictional competition in trust law is a story of successful lobbying by local banks and trust
lawyers, the principal beneficiaries of attracting new trust business to the state.”); Sterk,
Jurisdictional Competition, supra note 3, at 2117 (“[T]he beneficiaries of perpetual trusts are
concentrated and politically powerful banks and trust companies.”).
44. Cf. Tate, supra note 6, at 612 (noting that advertisements were intended to “introduce the
concept of a dynasty trust to wealthy individuals who either are unaware that such a tool exists or do
not understand its purpose; the goal is to attract more business by bringing in new clients or
informing existing clients about the potential benefits of a dynasty trust”).
45. See id. at 611–20.
46. See Sitkoff & Schanzenbach, Empirical Analysis, supra note 4, at 420 (estimating that states
that abolished the rule against perpetuities attracted $100 billion in trust funds); Sterk, Jurisdictional
Competition, supra note 3, at 2118 (“If a state legislature abolishes the Rule, the legislature may be
authorizing new inefficiencies—but those inefficiencies will not be felt by anyone in the state for at
least half a century!”).
47. On the legislative process leading up to the 1976 legislation, see Stanley S. Surrey,
Reflections on the Tax Reform Act of 1976, 25 CLEV. ST. L. REV. 303, 320 (1976) (describing
reforms, including the GST tax, as “the price that could be paid for the increased estate tax
exemption” demanded by farm groups, despite opposition from the American Bankers Association);
id. at 325 (describing input from bar groups as “pious urging of caution and really no action lest the
statute become too complex”).
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was essential to make the revised version acceptable.48 Although a few
experts noted the inherent tax avoidance incentive of the proposed $1
million exemption, little attention seems to have been paid to the prospect
that the exemption might be used to shelter trusts from GST tax in
perpetuity.49 Instead, Congress seems to have taken the rule against
perpetuities for granted as part of the backdrop of local law which defines
property rights and interests subject to federal taxation.50 In the event, the
assumption that the rule would remain in force as an indirect constraint on
the use of generation-skipping trusts proved to be a serious flaw in the
design of the GST tax. At this point, it may be possible to staunch the
revenue loss by denying the GST exemption prospectively for newly-created
perpetual trusts,51 but it seems unlikely that the damage to the rule against
perpetuities at the state level can be repaired any time soon.52

48. See 1984 Hearings, supra note 21, at 267 (American Bankers Association); id. at 278
(American Bar Association, Section of Taxation); id. at 282 (American Bar Association, Section of
Real Property, Probate and Trust Law); id. at 293 (American College of Probate Counsel); id. at 303
(American Institute of Certified Public Accountants). The professional organizations were also
unanimous in their condemnation of the original version of the GST tax, which had proved “unduly
complicated” and ultimately unworkable. STAFF OF J. COMM. ON TAX’N, GENERAL EXPLANATION
OF THE TAX REFORM ACT OF 1986, at 1263 (1986). By any standard, the 1986 legislation provided a
bonanza for wealthy taxpayers. In addition to the $1 million exemption for post-effective-date
transfers and a special $2 million per-grandchild exemption for direct skips occurring before 1990
(the “Gallo amendment”), the legislation retroactively repealed the original version of the GST tax
and sheltered pre-effective-date irrevocable trusts from the amended version. See Tax Reform Act of
1986, Pub. L. 99-514, § 1433, 100 Stat. 2085, 2731-32 (1986).
49. See 1984 Hearings, supra note 21, at 30, 46 (statement of Harry L. Gutman); id. at 337, 338
(statement of Raymond H. Young).
50. See 1976 BLUEBOOK, supra note 20, at 564 (“Most States have a rule against perpetuities
which limits the duration of a trust.”); see also Morgan v. Commissioner, 309 U.S. 78, 80 (1940)
(“State law creates legal interests and rights. The federal revenue acts designate what interests or
rights, so created, shall be taxed.”).
51. See STAFF OF J. COMM. ON TAX’N, OPTIONS TO IMPROVE TAX COMPLIANCE AND REFORM
TAX EXPENDITURES 392–95 (2005) (noting that proposed denial of GST exemption “does not
prevent an individual from creating a trust in a State that has repealed the rule against perpetuities”
but “does . . . eliminate a Federal transfer tax advantage for creating a trust in [such] a State”); U.S.
DEP’T OF THE TREASURY, GENERAL EXPLANATIONS OF THE ADMINISTRATION’S FISCAL YEAR 2013
REVENUE PROPOSALS 81–82 (2012) (proposing 90-year limit on GST exemption). The question
remains open whether GST exemption should be curtailed for trusts already in existence. Compare
Lawrence W. Waggoner, Effectively Curbing the GST Exemption for Perpetual Trusts, 135 TAX
NOTES 1267 (2012) (proposing denial of GST exemption for all trusts, including those already in
existence, that are not required to terminate within specified perpetuities period), with Dennis I.
Belcher et al., Federal Tax Rules Should Not Be Used to Limit Trust Duration, 136 TAX NOTES 832
(2012) (objecting to “unprecedented retroactive federal tax penalty” and proposing that any
prospective limitation on exemption not take effect before the end of the perpetuities period).
52. For a slightly more sanguine perspective, see Joel C. Dobris, Undoing Repeal of the Rule
Against Perpetuities: Federal and State Tools for Breaking Dynasty Trusts, 27 CARDOZO L. REV.
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At least two further factors should be considered in accounting for the
precipitous decline of the rule against perpetuities. One contributing factor
is the Uniform Statutory Rule Against Perpetuities,53 which was
promulgated by the Uniform Law Commission in 1986—coincidentally, the
same year that Congress amended the GST tax. The statutory rule
introduced a 90-year wait-and-see rule as an alternative to the common law
rule and authorized judicial reformation of interests that failed to vest within
the 90-year period.54 At its high water mark, the uniform statute was
adopted by more than half the states, but several of those states subsequently
joined the rush to abolish the rule. Although the Uniform Law Commission
undoubtedly hoped to reinvigorate the rule by making it simpler and more
effective, the uniform statute contained the seeds of its own destruction. By
promulgating a fixed 90-year wait-and-see period, the drafters of the
uniform statute implicitly endorsed the creation of 90-year trusts, which
Jesse Dukeminier predicted would cause the rule to fall into disuse and
eventually lead to its formal abolition.55 Moreover, several states that
adopted the uniform statute have extended the wait-and-see period well
beyond 90 years.56
As Stewart Sterk asked, “if ninety years is
unobjectionable, why not 150, or 200?”57 In hindsight, there is reason to
think that, contrary to the drafters’ intentions, the uniform statute played a
supporting role in bringing down the rule against perpetuities.
The second factor concerns the timing of the statutes abolishing the rule.
When Congress amended the GST tax in 1986, several states already
allowed perpetual trusts and the incentive for tax avoidance created by the
$1 million exemption was clear for all to see.58 Yet no state responded by

2537 (2006) (comparing trust termination to “tattoo removal”).
53 UNIF. STATUTORY RULE AGAINST PERPETUITIES, 8B U.L.A. 223 (2001 & 2012 Supp.).
54. See id. §§ 1–3.
55. See Jesse Dukeminier, The Uniform Statutory Rule Against Perpetuities: Ninety Years in
Limbo, 34 UCLA L. REV. 1023, 1025–27 (1987); Jesse Dukeminier, A Modern Guide to
Perpetuities, 74 CAL. L. REV. 1867, 1884 (1986) (describing the uniform statute as “revolutionary”
and predicting that, if adopted, it “probably will bring about the demise of the Rule Against
Perpetuities”).
56. See, e.g., ARIZ. REV. STAT. ANN. § 14-2901 (2012) (500 years); COLO. REV. STAT. § 15-111102.5 (2012) (1000 years); FLA. STAT. 689.225 (2012) (360 years); UTAH CODE ANN. § 75-2-1203
(2012) (1000 years).
57. Sterk, Jurisdictional Competition, supra note 3, at 2104; see also Dukeminier & Krier,
supra note 4, at 1310 (“USRAP makes a mere number the salient thing, the topic of debates, the
target of reforms, the subject of marginal alterations—extensions by a few years, by a few decades,
by a couple of centuries or so.”); Fellows, supra note 4, at 2519.
58. In congressional testimony, one expert warned that the proposed $1 million GST exemption
would give rise to “a substantial increase in the establishment of generation skipping trusts” because
“bank trust departments, financial planners, lawyers and others will be aggressively marketing and
advising establishment of million dollar generation skipping trusts, forever exempt from the tax no
matter how long or for how many generations the trusts continue.” 1984 Hearings, supra note 21, at
335, 338 (statement of Raymond H. Young). Another expert predicted that the $1 million exemption
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repealing the rule until Delaware did so in 1995, followed by Alaska two
years later.59 Why did it take so long? One possible explanation is that the
bankers and lawyers were slow on the uptake,60 but it seems likely that the
economic expansion and stock market boom of the late 1990s also played an
important role in stoking demand for perpetual trusts.61 After all, the statutes
abolishing the rule were enacted at the behest of lawyers and bankers who
presumably calculated that the time was ripe for a mass marketing campaign
to promote perpetual trusts. The promotional literature appears to have been
aimed primarily at clients with up to $1 million of disposable wealth and
little prior experience with trust investments or sophisticated tax planning.62
Such a marketing strategy, with its rhetorical appeal to unlimited private
capital accumulation, settlor autonomy, and dynastic pretensions, makes far
more sense in times of general prosperity and rising expectations than during
an economic slump.63
In sum, it seems indisputable that the 1986 GST tax amendments played
a significant role in hastening the demise of the rule against perpetuities.
Without the tax loophole opened by the GST exemption for perpetual taxexempt trusts, the competition among states to attract trust business by

would create a “significant psychological push to use trusts to take advantage of any available
exemption” and a “great temptation to undervalue assets passing to generation-skipping trusts in
order to keep them within the exemption,” leading to “serious avoidance problems.” Id. at 30, 37, 46
(statement of Harry L. Gutman).
59. See 70 Del. Laws ch. 164, §§ 1–3 (1995) (abolishing rule for personal property held in trust);
20 Alaska Sess. Laws ch. 6, § 6 (1997). The preamble to the Delaware statute indicates that it was
prompted by a desire to compete for trust business with “innovative jurisdictions” such as South
Dakota that had “abolished the rule against perpetuities.” See Jesse Dukeminier, Dynasty Trusts:
Sheltering Descendants From Transfer Taxes, 23 EST. PLAN. 417, 422–23 (1996) (quoting
preamble).
60. See Sitkoff & Schanzenbach, Empirical Analysis, supra note 4, at 2492 (speculating that due
to the complexity of the GST tax and the rule against perpetuities the interaction was “not
immediately obvious” and that it would take time “to digest the change in the law and to sell the new
product to clients”).
61. During the same period, the mass marketing of other estate planning techniques coincided
with widespread changes in state law concerning asset protection trusts, family limited partnerships,
and limited liability companies.
62. Undoubtedly the target audience also included high-end clients, though presumably these
would already have access to sophisticated estate planning advice and would be less likely to
respond to the marketing pitch. Cf. Sitkoff & Schanzenbach, Empirical Analysis, supra note 4, at
396–97 (noting that average account size in Illinois and Delaware exceeded the GST exemption and
conjecturing that “the inflow of very large accounts reflects the administrative efficiencies of
locating all of one’s trust assets in a single account with one institutional trustee”).
63. See Joel C. Dobris, The Death of the Rule Against Perpetuities, or the RAP Has No
Friends—An Essay, 35 REAL PROP. PROB. & TR. J. 601 (2000) (discussing changing attitudes toward
wealth, inequality and perpetual trusts).
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abolishing the rule would not have unfolded as it did. At the same time, the
tax-driven account does not provide a completely satisfactory explanation of
the rule’s decline. Bankers and lawyers who promote perpetual trusts pitch
them to potential clients as multipurpose vehicles that offer an array of
benefits including tax reduction, fiduciary management, financial security
for successive generations, and protection from creditors, along with the
added psychic satisfaction of dynastic continuity. That some of these
benefits may be overstated or even illusory does not make them any less
marketable than other speculative elements of value. Perpetual trusts, like
other upscale goods and services, are sold at retail to well-heeled consumers
through appeals to vanity, anxiety, and ambition, as well as tangible
financial returns.
VI. CONCLUSION
If the demand for perpetual trusts is driven by competition for trust
business, then it seems fair to say that the rule against perpetuities is a
collateral casualty of that competition. Responsibility for the death of the
rule lies at least as much with the bankers and lawyers who promote
perpetual trusts as with the GST exemption that they have so assiduously
exploited. It is also possible, however, that the rule would have run its
course in any event and that its demise was merely hastened by the 1986
GST tax amendments. For the time being, one can only speculate about the
long-term consequences of abandoning the rule, both for local property law
and for the federal transfer tax system. But the process, once set in motion,
appears to be irreversible. Perpetual trusts, for better or for worse, will be
with us for a very long time.
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